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 Abstract 
  This paper examines a model of dynamic price adjustment based 
on the assumption that information disseminates slowly throughout 
the population.  Compared to the commonly used sticky-price model, 
this sticky-information model displays three, related properties 
that are more consistent with accepted views about the effects of 
monetary policy.  First, disinflations are always contractionary 
(although announced disinflations are less contractionary than 
surprise ones).  Second, monetary policy shocks have their maximum 
impact on inflation with a substantial delay.  Third, the change 
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  The dynamic effects of aggregate demand on output and 
inflation remain a theoretical puzzle for macroeconomists.  In 
recent years, much of the literature on this topic has used a 
model of time-contingent price adjustment.  This model, often 
called "the new Keynesian Phillips curve," builds on the work of 
John Taylor (1980), Julio Rotemberg (1982), and Guillermo Calvo 
(1983).  As the recent survey by Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali, and 
Mark Gertler (1999) illustrates, this model is widely used in 
theoretical analysis of monetary policy.  Bennett McCallum (1997) 
has called it "the closest thing there is to a standard 
specification." 
  Yet there is growing awareness that this model is hard to 
square with the facts.  Laurence Ball (1994a) shows that the model 
yields the surprising result that announced, credible 
disinflations cause booms rather than recessions.  Jeffrey Fuhrer 
and George Moore (1995) argue that it cannot explain why inflation 
is so persistent.  Gregory Mankiw (2001) notes that it has trouble 
explaining why shocks to monetary policy have a delayed and 
gradual effect on inflation.  All of these problems arise from the 
same source: Although the price level is sticky in this model, the 
inflation rate can change quickly.  By contrast, empirical 
analyses of the inflation process (e.g., Robert Gordon, 1996) 
typically give a large role to "inflation inertia." 
  This paper proposes a new model to explain the dynamic  
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effects of aggregate demand on output and the price level.  The 
essence of the model is that information about macroeconomic 
conditions diffuses slowly through the population.  This slow 
diffusion could arise because of either costs of acquiring 
information or costs to reoptimization.  In either case, although 
prices are always changing, pricing decisions are not always based 
on current information.  We call this a sticky-information model 
to contrast it to the standard sticky-price model on which the new 
Keynesian Phillips curve is based. 
  To formalize these ideas, we assume that each period a 
fraction of the population updates themselves on the current state 
of the economy and computes optimal prices based on that 
information.  The rest of the population continues to set prices 
based on old plans and outdated information.  Thus, this model 
combines elements of Calvo's (1983) model of random adjustment 
with elements of Robert Lucas's (1973) model of imperfect 
information.  
  The implications of our sticky-information model, however, 
are closer to those of Stanley Fischer's (1977) contracting model. 
  As in the Fischer model, the current price level depends on 
expectations of the current price level formed quite far in the 
past.  In the Fischer model, those expectations matter because 
they are built into contracts.  In our model, they matter because 
some price setters are still setting prices based on old decisions  
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and old information.
1 
  After introducing the sticky-information model in Section I, 
we examine the dynamic response to monetary policy in Section II. 
 In contrast to the standard sticky-price model, which allows for 
the possibility of disinflationary booms, the sticky-information 
model predicts that disinflations always cause recessions.  In 
some ways, the dynamic response in the sticky-information model 
resembles Phillips curves with backward-looking expectations.  Yet 
there is an important difference: In the sticky-information model, 
expectations are rational, and credibility matters.  In 
particular, the farther in advance a disinflationary policy is 
anticipated, the smaller is the resulting recession. 
  In Section III we make the model more realistic by adding a 
simple yet empirically plausible stochastic process for the money 
supply.  After calibrating the model, we examine how output and 
inflation respond to a typical monetary policy shock.  We find 
that the sticky-price model yields implausible impulse response 
                         
    
1 We should also note several other intellectual antecedents. 
  Gabaix and Laibson (2000) suggest that consumption behavior is 
better understood with the assumption that households update their 
optimal consumption only sporadically; it was in fact a 
presentation of the Gabaix-Laibson paper that started us working 
on this project.  Another related paper is Ball (2000), who tries 
to explain price dynamics with the assumption that price setters 
use optimal univariate forecasts but ignore other potentially 
relevant information.  In addition, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) 
assume a one-period decision lag for some price setters.  Finally, 
after developing our model, we became aware of Koenig (1997); 
Koenig's model of aggregate price dynamics is motivated very 
differently from ours and is applied to a different range of 
questions, but it has a formal structure that is similar to the 
model explored here.  
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functions: According to this model, the maximum impact of a 
monetary shock on inflation occurs immediately.  By contrast, in 
the sticky-information model, the maximum impact of monetary 
shocks on inflation occurs after 7 quarters.  This result more 
closely matches the estimates from econometric studies and the 
conventional wisdom of central bankers. 
  Section IV then examines whether the models can explain the 
central finding from the empirical literature on the Phillips 
curve--namely, that vigorous economic activity causes inflation to 
rise.  The standard sticky-price model is inconsistent with this 
finding and, in fact, yields a correlation of the wrong sign.  By 
contrast, the sticky-information model can explain the widely 
noted correlation between economic activity and changes in 
inflation.  
  Section V concludes.  We consider how our sticky-information 
model relates to the broader new Keynesian literature on price 
adjustment.  We also mention one piece of microeconomic evidence 
that favors this new model over the alternatives. 
 
I. A Tale of Two Models 
  We begin by deriving the two models: the standard sticky-
price model, which yields the new Keynesian Phillips curve, and 
the proposed sticky-information model. 
 
A Sticky-Price Model: The New Keynesian Phillips Curve  
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  Here we review the standard derivation of the new Keynesian 
Phillips curve, as based on the Calvo model.  In this model, firms 
follow time-contingent price adjustment rules.  The time for price 
adjustment does not follow a deterministic schedule, however, but 
arrives randomly.  Every period, a fraction λ of firms adjust 
prices.  Each firm has the same probability of being one of the 
adjusting firms, regardless of how long it has been since its last 
price adjustment.   
  We start with three basic relationships.  The first concerns 
the firm's desired price, which is the price that would maximize 
profit at that moment in time.  With all variables expressed in 
logs, the desired price is: 
   p * t = pt + αyt. 
This equation says that a firm's desired price p* depends on the 
overall price level p and output y.  (Potential output is 
normalized to zero here, so y should be interpreted as the output 
gap.)  A firm's desired relative price, p*-p, rises in booms and 
falls in recessions. 
  Although we won't derive this equation from a firm's profit 
maximization problem, one could easily do so, following Blanchard 
and Kiyotaki (1987).  Imagine a world populated by identical 
monopolistically competitive firms.  When the economy goes into a 
boom, each firm experiences increased demand for its product.   
Because marginal cost rises with higher levels of output, greater 
demand means that each firm would like to raise its relative  
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price. 
  In this model, however, firms rarely charge their desired 
prices, because price adjustment is infrequent.  When a firm has 
the opportunity to change its price, it sets its price equal to 
the average desired price until the next price adjustment.  The 
adjustment price x is determined by the second equation: 
 
             ∞       
   x t = λ Σ (1-λ)
j Etp*t+j 
            j=0  
According to this equation, the adjustment price equals a weighted 
average of the current and all future desired prices.  Desired 
prices farther in the future are given less weight because the 
firm may experience another price adjustment between now and that 
future date.  This possibility makes that future desired price 
less relevant for the current pricing decision.  The rate of 
arrival for price adjustments, λ, determines how fast the weights 
decline. 
  The third key equation in the model determines the overall 
price level p: 
 
             ∞  
   p t = λ Σ (1-λ)
j xt-j 
            j=0 
According to this equation, the price level is an average of all 
prices in the economy and, therefore, a weighted average of all 
the prices firms have set in the past.  The rate of arrival for 
price adjustments, λ, also determines how fast these weights  
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decline.  The faster price adjustment occurs, the less relevant 
past pricing decisions are for the current price level. 
  Solving this model is a matter of straightforward algebra.   
We obtain the following: 
   πt = [αλ
2/(1-λ)]yt + Etπt+1 
where  πt=pt-pt-1 is the inflation rate.  Thus, we obtain the new 
Keynesian Phillips curve.  Inflation today is a function of output 
and inflation expected to prevail in the next period.  This model 
has become the workhorse for much recent research on monetary 
policy.   
 
A Sticky-Information Model 
  This section proposes an alternative model of price dynamics. 
 In this model, every firm sets its price every period, but firms 
gather information and recompute optimal prices slowly over time. 
  In each period, a fraction λ of firms obtains new information 
about the state of the economy and computes a new path of optimal 
prices.  Other firms continue to set prices based on old plans and 
outdated information.  We make an assumption about information 
arrival that is analogous to the adjustment assumption in the 
Calvo model: Each firm has the same probability of being one of 
the firms updating their pricing plans, regardless of how long it 
has been since its last update.   
  As before, a firm's optimal price is 
   p * t = pt + αyt.  
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A firm that last updated its plans j periods ago sets the price 
   x
j
t = Et-jp*t. 
The aggregate price level is the average of the prices of all 
firms in the economy: 
 
                ∞  




              j=0 
Putting these three equations together yields the following 
equation for the price level: 
 
             ∞  
   p t = λ Σ (1-λ)
j  Et-j(pt + αyt). 
            j=0 
The short-run Phillips curve is very much apparent in this 
equation: Output is positively associated with surprise movements 
in the price level. 
  With some tedious algebraic manipulation, which we leave to 
the appendix, this equation for the price level yields the 
following equation for the inflation rate: 
 
                     ∞  
   πt = [αλ/(1-λ)]yt  + λ Σ (1-λ)
j  Et-1-j(πt + αgt). 
                    j=0 
where gt=yt-yt-1 is the growth rate of output.  Inflation depends 
on output, expectations of inflation, and expectations of output 
growth.  We call this the sticky-information Phillips curve. 
  Take note of the timing of the expectations.  In the standard 
sticky-price model, current expectations about future economic  
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conditions play an important role in determining the inflation 
rate.  In this sticky-information model, as in Fischer (1977), 
expectations are again important, but the relevant expectations 
are past expectations of current economic conditions.  This 
difference yields large differences in the dynamic pattern of 
prices and output in response to monetary policy, as we see in the 
next section.  
  One theoretical advantage of the sticky-information model is 
that it survives the McCallum critique.  McCallum (1998) has 
criticized the standard sticky-price model on the grounds that it 
violates a strict form of the natural rate hypothesis, according 
to which "there is no inflation policy--no money creation scheme--
that will keep output high permanently."  Following Lucas (1972), 
McCallum argues that "it seems a priori implausible that a nation 
can enrich itself in real terms permanently by any type of 
monetary policy, by any path of paper money creation."  The 
sticky-price model fails this test because a policy of permanently 
falling inflation will keep output permanently high.  By contrast, 
the sticky-information model satisfies this strict version of the 
natural rate hypothesis.  Absent surprises, it must be the case 
that pt=Et-jpt, which in turn implies yt=0.  Thus, the McCallum 
critique favors the sticky-information Phillips curve over the 
more commonly used alternative. 
 
II. Inflation and Output Dynamics in the Sticky-Information Model  
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  Having presented the sticky-information Phillips curve, we 
now examine its dynamic properties.  To do this, we need to 
complete the model with an equation for aggregate demand.  We use 
the simplest specification possible: 
      m = p + y. 
where m is nominal GDP.  This equation can be viewed as a 
quantity-theory approach to aggregate demand, where m is 
interpreted as the money supply and log velocity is assumed 
constant at zero.  Alternatively, m can be viewed more broadly as 
incorporating the many other variables that shift aggregate 
demand.  We take m to be exogenous.  Our goal is to examine how 
output and inflation respond to changes in the path of m.
2 
  As we proceed, it will be useful to compare the dynamics of 
our proposed sticky-information Phillips curve with more familiar 
models.  We use two such benchmarks.  The first is the sticky-
price model presented earlier, which yields the standard new 
Keynesian Phillips curve: 
   πt = βyt + Etπt+1 
where β= [αλ
2/(1-λ)] and the expectations are assumed to be formed 
rationally.  The second is a backward-looking model:  
   πt = βyt + πt-1.   
                         
    
2 There are other, perhaps more realistic, ways to add 
aggregate demand to this model.  One possibility would be to add 
an IS equation together with an interest-rate policy rule for the 
central bank.  Such an approach is more complicated and involves 
more free parameters.  We believe the simpler approach taken here 
best illustrates the key differences between the sticky-
information model and more conventional alternatives.  
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This backward-looking model resembles the equations estimated in 
the empirical literature on the Phillips curve (as discussed in, 
e.g., Gordon, 1996).  It can be viewed as the sticky-price model 
together with the assumption of adaptive expectations: Etπt+1 = πt-
1.  
  When we present simulated results from these models, we try 
to pick plausible parameter values.  Some of these parameters 
depend on the time interval.  For concreteness, we take the period 
in the model to equal one quarter.  We set α=.1 and λ=.25 (and, 
thus, β=.0083).  This value of λ means that firms on average make 
adjustments once a year.  The small value of α means that a firm's 
desired relative price is not very sensitive to macroeconomic 
conditions.  Note that the firm's desired nominal price can now be 
written as   
   p * t = (1-α)pt + αmt. 
If  α is small, then each firm gives more weight to what other 
firms are charging than to the level of aggregate demand.
3 
  We now consider three hypothetical, policy experiments.  In 
                         
    
3 In the backward-looking model, the parameter β determines 
the cost of disinflation. According to this model, if output falls 
1 percent below potential for one quarter, then the inflation rate 
falls by β if measured at a quarterly rate, or 4β if annualized.  
If output falls by 1 percent below potential for one year, then 
the annualized inflation rate falls by 16β.  Thus, the sacrifice 
ratio--the output loss associated with reducing inflation by one 
percentage point--is 1/(16β).  Our parameters put the sacrifice at 
7.5.  For comparison, Okun's (1978) classic study estimated the 
sacrifice ratio to be between 6 and 18 percent; Gordon (1997, 
footnote 8) puts it at 6.4.  Thus, our backward-looking model is 
in the ballpark of similar models used the previous literature.  
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each experiment, we posit a path for aggregate demand m.  We then 
derive the path for output and inflation generated by the sticky-
information model and compare it to the paths generated by the two 
benchmark models.  The details of the solution are presented in 
the appendix.  Here we discuss the dynamic paths followed by 
output and inflation. 
  
Experiment 1: A Drop in the Level of Aggregate Demand 
  The first experiment we consider is a sudden and permanent 
drop in the level of aggregate demand.  The demand variable mt is 
constant and then, at time zero, unexpectedly falls by 10 percent 
and remains at this new level. 
  The top graph in Figure 1 shows the path of output predicted 
by each of the three models.  In all three models, the fall in 
demand causes a recession, which gradually dissipates over time.  
The impact of the fall in demand on output is close to zero at 16 
quarters.  The backward-looking model generates a oscillatory 
pattern, while the other two models yield monotonic paths.   
Otherwise, the models seem to yield similar results.   
  Differences among the models become more apparent, however, 
when we examine the response of inflation in the bottom of Figure 
1.  In the sticky-price model, the greatest impact of the fall in 
demand on inflation occurs immediately.  The other two models show 
a more gradual response.  In the sticky-information model, the 
maximum impact of the fall in demand on inflation occurs at 7  
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quarters.  Inflation could well be described as inertial.   
 
Experiment 2: A Sudden Disinflation 
  The second experiment we consider is a sudden and permanent 
shift in the rate of demand growth.  The demand variable mt is 
assumed to grow at 10 percent per year (2.5 percent per period) 
until time zero.  In period zero, the central bank sets mt the 
same as it was in the previous period and, at the same time, 
announces that mt will thereafter remain constant.  Figure 2 shows 
the path of output and inflation predicted by the three models.   
  According to the sticky-price model, inflation falls 
immediately to the lower level.  Price setters, realizing that 
disinflation is underway, immediately respond by making smaller 
price adjustments.  Prices are sticky in the sticky-price model, 
but inflation exhibits no inertia.  The response of output, of 
course, is the other side of the coin.  Because inflation responds 
instantly to the fall in money growth, output does not change.  As 
in Phelps (1978), disinflation is costless. 
  By contrast, the sticky-information model predicts a gradual 
reduction in inflation.  Even after the disinflationary policy is 
in place, most price setters are still marking up prices based on 
old decisions and outdated information.  As a result of this 
inertial behavior, inflation is little changed one or two quarters 
after the disinflation has begun.  With a constant money supply 
and rising prices, the economy experiences a recession, which  
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reaches a trough 6 quarters after the policy change.  Output then 
gradually recovers and is almost back to normal after 20 quarters. 




Experiment 3: An Anticipated Disinflation 
  Now suppose that the disinflation in our previous experiment 
is announced and credible two years (8 periods) in advance.  Let's 
consider how this anticipated disinflation affects the path of 
output and inflation. 
  Figure 3 shows output and inflation according to the three 
models.  The predictions for the backward-looking model are 
exactly the same as in Experiment 2: The assumption of adaptive 
expectations prevents the announcement from having any effect.   
But the results are different in the other two models, which posit 
rational expectations.   
  In the sticky-price model, the announced disinflation causes 
a boom.  As Ball (1994a) emphasizes, inflation in this model moves 
in anticipation of demand.  When price setters anticipate a 
slowdown in money growth, inflation falls immediately.  This fall 
in inflation, together with continued increases in the money 
                         
    
4 Ball (1994b) examines disinflation for a number of 
countries.  For the nine countries for which quarterly data are 
available, he identifies 28 periods of disinflation.  In 27 of 
these cases, the decline in inflation is associated with a fall in 
output below its trend level.  This finding is related to the 
acceleration phenomenon we document and discuss below.  
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supply, leads to rising real money balances and higher output.   
  By contrast, the sticky-information model does not produce 
booms in response to anticipated disinflations.  In this model, 
there is no change in output or inflation until the 
disinflationary policy of slower money growth begins.  Then, the 
disinflation causes a recession. 
  It would be wrong to conclude, however, that the announcement 
has no effect in the sticky-information model.  Because of the 
announcement, many price setters have already adjusted their plans 
in response to the disinflationary policy when it begins.  As a 
result, an announced slowdown in money growth leads to a quicker 
inflation response and a smaller output loss than does a sudden 
slowdown in money growth.  For these parameters, a disinflation 
announced and fully credible 8 quarters in advance has a 
cumulative cost that is about one-fifth the size of the surprise 
disinflation. 
  In a way, the sticky-information model combines elements of 
the other two models.  Like the backward-looking model (but unlike 
the sticky-price model), disinflations consistently cause 
recessions rather than booms.  Like the sticky-price model (but 
unlike the backward-looking model), expectations, announcements, 
and credibility matter for the path of inflation and output.   
These features of the sticky-information model seem consistent 
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III. The Response to Realistic Monetary Shocks 
  So far, we have compared how output and inflation respond to 
hypothetical paths for aggregate demand.  We now take a step 
toward greater realism.  In particular, we assume a plausible 
stochastic process for the money supply and then examine the 
implied processes of output and inflation.  As Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) discuss, economists have a good sense 
of the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks.  One way to 
gauge a model's empirical validity is to see if it can generate 
plausible responses to such shocks. 
 
The Stochastic Process for the Money Supply 
  We model the growth in the demand variable m as following a 
first-order autoregressive process: Δmt = ρΔmt-1 + εt.  In this 
environment, the price level is nonstationary, but the inflation 
rate is stationary.   
  To calibrate ρ, we looked at quarterly U.S. data from 1960 to 
1999.  The variable m can interpreted as a measure of money 
supply, such as M1 or M2, or more broadly as a measure of 
aggregate demand, such as nominal GDP.  The first autocorrelations 
for these time series are 0.57 for M1 growth, 0.63 for M2 growth, 
and 0.32 for nominal GDP growth.  Based on these numbers, we set 
ρ=0.5.  The standard deviation of the residual is 0.009 for M1, 
0.006 for M2, and 0.008 for nominal GDP, so we assume a standard 
deviation of 0.007 (although this choice affects only the scale  
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and not the shape of the dynamic paths). 
  The positive value of ρ means that a monetary shock builds 
over time.  That is, a positive shock ε causes m to jump up and 
then to continue to rise.  With ρ=0.5, the level of m eventually 
asymptotes to a plateau that is twice as high as the initial 
shock.  This pattern for monetary shocks is broadly consistent 




  Figure 4 show the response of output and inflation to a one-
standard-deviation contractionary monetary policy shock.  In all 
three models, output exhibits a hump-shaped response.  The impact 
on output at first increases because demand is building over time. 
 It eventually decays because prices adjust.  The backward-looking 
model yields oscillatory dynamics, while the other two models 
yield a monotonic recovery from the recession. 
  The impulse responses for inflation to the monetary shock 
show the differences between the sticky-price and sticky-
information models.  In the sticky-price model, inflation responds 
quickly to a monetary policy shock.  In fact, the largest impact 
on inflation comes immediately.  By contrast, the sticky-
information model displays some of the inflation inertia that is 
built into the backward-looking model.  For these parameters, a 
                         
    
5 For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998) 
conclude that an AR(1) process offers a good description of 
monetary policy shocks when using M2 as the measure of money.    
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monetary policy shock in the sticky-information model has its 
maximum impact on inflation after 7 quarters. 
  The impulse response function for the sticky-information 
model is far more consistent with conventional views about the 
effects of monetary policy.  Economists such as Milton Friedman 
(1948) have emphasized the long lags inherent in macroeconomic 
policy.  In particular, a long lag between monetary policy actions 
and inflation is accepted by most central bankers and confirmed by 
most econometric studies.
6  Figure 4 shows that the sticky-
information model can explain a long lag between monetary policy 
shocks and inflation, while the standard sticky-price model 
cannot. 
   
Inflation Persistence 
  In an important but cryptic paper, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) 
argue that the standard sticky-price model "is incapable of 
imparting the persistence to inflation that we find in the data." 
 (p. 127)  In the model, they claim, "the autocorrelation function 
of inflation...will die out very rapidly." (p. 152)  This 
contradicts the empirical autocorrelations of inflation, which 
decay slowly. 
  Motivated by these arguments, we calculated the implied 
autocorrelations of inflation in our three models.  We maintain 
                         
    
6 See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) or Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).  
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the empirically realistic process for money growth used above: Δmt 
= 0.5Δmt-1 + εt.  Table 1 presents the first eight autocorrelations 
of inflation implied by the models, as well as the actual 
autocorrelations of inflation using the GDP deflator, the consumer 
price index, and the core CPI. (The core CPI is the index 
excluding food and energy.)  Notice that inflation is highly 
autocorrelated in all three models.  That is, given the 
empirically realistic process for the money supply, all the models 
deliver plausible persistence in inflation. 
  In the end, we are led to agree with Taylor (1999, p. 1040), 
who responds to Fuhrer and Moore by observing that "inflation 
persistence could be due to serial correlation of money."  This is 
why all three models deliver high autocorrelations in Table 1.   
Yet we also agree with Fuhrer and Moore's deeper point: The 
standard sticky-price model does not deliver empirically 
reasonable dynamics for inflation and output.  The key empirical 
fact that is hard to match, however, is not the high 
autocorrelations of inflation, but the delayed response of 
inflation to monetary policy shocks. 
 
III. The Acceleration Phenomenon 
  When economists want to document the Phillips curve 
relationship in U.S. data from the last few decades of the 
twentieth century, a common approach is to look at a scatterplot 
of the change in inflation and some level of economic activity,  
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such as unemployment or detrended output.  This scatterplot shows 
that when economic activity is vigorous, as represented by low 
unemployment or high output, inflation tend to rise.  We call this 
correlation the acceleration phenomenon.
7 
  Panel A of Table 2 demonstrates the acceleration phenomenon 
using U.S. quarterly data from 1960 to 1999.  For these 
calculations, output yt is the deviation of log real GDP from 
trend, where trend is calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter.  We use three measures of inflation: the GDP deflator, the 
CPI, and the core CPI.  We use two timing conventions: We 
correlate yt with πt+2-πt-2, the one-year change in inflation 
centered around the observation date, and with πt+4-πt-4, the two-
year change in inflation.  All six correlations are positive and 
statistically significant. In U.S. data, high output is associated 
with rising inflation. 
  We now consider whether the models can generate the positive 
correlation between output and the change in inflation.  We assume 
the same stochastic process for the money supply as in the 
previous section (Δmt = 0.5Δmt-1 + εt) and the same parameters 
(α=.1 and λ=.25).  Then, as explained in the appendix, we compute 
the population correlation between output and the change in 
inflation. 
                         
    
7 For some examples of economists using such a scatterplot to 
demonstrate the acceleration phenomenon, see Abel and Bernanke 
(1998, p. 457), Blanchard (2000, p. 155), Dornbusch, Fischer, 
Startz (2001, p. 109), Hall and Taylor (1993, p. 217), and Stock 
and Watson (1999, p. 48).  
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  Panel B of Table 2 shows the correlation predicted by the 
models.  Not surprisingly, the backward-looking model predicts a 
high correlation.  Because πt -   πt-1 = βyt in this model, the 
correlation is perfect for the one-period change in inflation and 
only slightly lower for longer changes.  In essence, the model 
builds in the acceleration phenomenon through the assumption of 
adaptive expectations.  This is hardly a major intellectual 
victory: The appeal of the backward-looking model comes not from 
its theoretical underpinnings but from its ability to fit this 
phenomenon. 
  We next look at the two models with better foundations.   
Table 2 shows that the sticky-price model yields no association 
between output and the change in inflation.  For the one-year 
change, the correlation between these variables is -0.13, which is 
small and the wrong sign.  By contrast, the sticky-information 
model yields a strong, positive association.  According to this 
model, the correlation between output and the change in inflation 
is 0.43.
8 
  To understand these results, recall the impulse response 
functions.  In the sticky-price model, when the economy 
experiences a contractionary monetary shock, output falls for a 
                         
    
8 Our finding that the calibrated sticky-price model predicts 
a negative correlation between y and Δπ (in contrast to the 
positive correlation in the data) is related to Gali and Gertler's 
finding (1999) that econometric estimation of this model yields a 
coefficient on output of the wrong sign.  Gali and Gertler's 
proposed fix to the sticky-price model, however, differs 
substantially from the sticky-information model proposed here.  
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while.  Inflation falls immediately, and then starts rising.   
Thus, low output coincides with falling inflation at first, but 
then coincides with rising inflation for a long period.  This 
generates the small, negative correlation. 
  By contrast, in the sticky-information model, inflation 
adjusts slowly to a monetary shock.  When a contractionary shock 
lowers output, it also leads to a prolonged period of falling 
inflation.  This generates the positive correlation between output 
and the change in inflation. 
  Table 3 presents a sensitivity analysis of this correlation 
to alternative parameter values.  Panel (a) of the table shows the 
correlation produced by the sticky-price model for different 
parameter values.  Panel (b) shows the correlation produced by the 
sticky-information model.  The sticky-price model consistently 
generates a small correlation of the wrong sign, while the sticky-
information model typically yields a positive correlation between 




  This paper has explored a dynamic model of price adjustment. 
  In particular, we have proposed a model to replace the widely 
                         
    
9 These simulated correlations are computed under the 
assumption that all fluctuations are due to demand shocks.  If we 
were to append supply shocks to this model, the predicted 
correlations would be driven down, because such shocks push 
inflation and output in opposite directions.  Thus, supply shocks 
would make it even harder for the sticky-price model to match the 
positive correlation in the data.  
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used "new Keynesian Phillips curve."  In this model, prices are 
always changing, but decisionmakers are slow to update their 
pricing strategies in response to new information.   
  Although the choice between the sticky-information model and 
the standard sticky-price model is ultimately an empirical issue, 
three of our findings suggest that the sticky-information model is 
more consistent with conventional views of how monetary policy 
works.  First, in the sticky-information model, disinflations are 
always contractionary (although announced disinflations are less 
costly than surprise ones).  Second, in the sticky-information 
model, monetary shocks have their maximum effect on inflation with 
a substantial delay.  Third, the sticky-information model can 
explain the acceleration phenomenon that vigorous economic 
activity is positively correlated with rising inflation.  
  The dynamic patterns implied by the sticky-information model 
resemble those from the Fischer (1977) contracting model, although 
long-term contracts have no role.  In both models, past 
expectations of the current price level play a central role in 
inflation dynamics.  In a sense, the slow dissemination of 
information in our model yields a nominal rigidity similar to the 
one Fischer assumed in his contracts.   
  Critics of the Fischer contracting model (e.g., Robert Barro, 
1977) have noted that it is hard to rationalize signing such 
contracts ex ante or enforcing them ex post in light of the 
obvious inefficiencies they cause.  Such critiques do not apply to  
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the model proposed here.  The assumption of slow information 
diffusion, perhaps due to costs of acquiring or acting on new 
information, leaves no apparent, unrealized gains from trade.   
Thus, sticky information offers a more compelling rationale for 
this type of nominal rigidity. 
  Moving the theory of price adjustment away from sticky prices 
toward sticky information may seem like a radical suggestion, but 
we temper it with an important observation: Many lessons from the 
"new Keynesian" literature on price adjustment apply as well to 
our sticky-information model as they do to the standard sticky-
price model. 
  An early lesson about price adjustment by firms with some 
degree of monopoly power is that the private losses from sticky 
prices are only second order, even if the social losses are first 
order.  (Mankiw, 1985; Akerlof and Yellen, 1985).  Thus, if firms 
face small costs of price adjustment or are only near rational, 
they may choose to maintain sticky prices, even if the 
macroeconomic effect of doing so is significant.  When we move 
from sticky prices to sticky information, this lesson applies in 
somewhat modified form.  If there are small costs of acquiring 
information or recomputing optimal plans, firms may choose not to 
update their pricing strategies.  The private loss from 
maintaining old decisions, like the cost of maintaining old 
prices, is second order. 
  Another lesson from the literature on price adjustment is  
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that real rigidities amplify monetary non-neutralities. (Ball and 
Romer, 1990)  Real rigidity is defined as a lack of sensitivity of 
desired relative prices to macroeconomic conditions.  Here, this 
translates into a small value of the parameter α.  Real rigidities 
also play a role in our sticky-information model.  Price setters 
who are updating their decisions are aware that other price 
setters are not, and this knowledge limits the size their 
adjustments, especially when α is small.  As a result, real 
rigidity tends to exacerbate the effects of monetary policy. 
  An advantage of sticky-information over sticky-price models 
is that they more naturally justify the widely assumed time-
contingent adjustment process.  If firms have sticky prices 
because of menu costs but are always collecting information and 
optimizing in response to that information, then it is natural to 
assume state-contingent adjustment.  Dynamic models of state-
contingent adjustment, however, are often yield empirically 
implausible results; Caplin and Spulber's (1987) conclusion of 
monetary neutrality is a famous example.  By contrast, if firms 
face costs of collecting information and choosing optimal plans, 
then it is natural to assume that their adjustment process is 
time-contingent.  Price setters cannot react between scheduled 
adjustments, because they are not collecting the information and 
performing the calculations necessary for that purpose. 
  Finally, we offer one piece of microeconomic evidence.  Mark 
Zbaracki et al. (2000) have studied in detail the costs associated  
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with changing prices at a single large manufacturing firm.  In 
this extensive case study, the authors find that only a small 
percentage of these costs are the physical costs of printing and 
distributing price lists.  Far more important are the "managerial 
and customer costs," which include the costs of information-
gathering, decision-making, negotiation, and communication.   
Whether our sticky-information model captures the macroeconomic 
effects of such costs is an open question.  But this microeconomic 
evidence, as well as the empirical problems associated with the 
existing sticky-price models, suggest that macroeconomists need to 
think more broadly about the frictions that impede price 
adjustment.  This paper has taken a small step in that direction.  
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Table 1 
Autocorrelations for Inflation: Predicted and Actual 
 
  Sticky-   Sticky- Backward-  Actual: Actual      Actual 
 Information  Price    Looking  GDP    CPI      Core 
 Model    Model   Model    Deflator         CPI 
1  0.99    0.92   0.99   0.89   0.76   0.76 
2  0.95    0.85   0.98   0.83   0.72   0.71 
3  0.89    0.78   0.96   0.81     0.73     0.69   
4 0.82      0.71     0.94     0.78     0.62     0.59   
5 0.74      0.65     0.90     0.71     0.57     0.55   
6 0.66      0.59     0.86     0.65     0.51     0.54   
7 0.57      0.54     0.81     0.61     0.44     0.46   
8 0.48      0.50     0.75     0.58     0.33     0.38   
 
Note: The first three columns of this table show the 
autocorrelations of inflation predicted by three models.  These 
calculations assume that money growth follows the process Δmt = 
0.5Δmt-1 + εt.  The model parameters are set to α=.1 and λ=.25.  
The last three columns show the actual autocorrelations of 
quarterly inflation rates.  
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Table 2 
The Acceleration Phenomenon 
 
     corr(yt, πt+2-πt-2) corr(yt, πt+4-πt-4) 
A. Actual 
GDP  deflator     .48     .60   
CPI       .38     .46 
core  CPI      .46     .51 
 
B. Predicted 
Backward-Looking  Model     .99       .99 
Sticky-Price  Model    -.13     -.11 
Sticky-Information  Model     .43       .40 
 
Note:  Panel A of this table shows the correlation between output 
and the change in inflation in U.S. quarterly data from 1960 to 
1999.  The variable y is measured as log real GDP detrended with 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  Panel B shows the correlation 
between output and the change in inflation predicted by three 
models.  These correlations assumes money growth follows the 
process: Δmt = 0.5Δmt-1 + εt.  The model parameters are set to α=.1 
and λ=.25.   
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Table 3 
The Acceleration Phenomenon: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
A. The Sticky-Price Model 
                   
   α=.05    α=.1   α=.5   α=1.0 
    λ=.1   -0.08   -0.09   -0.12   -0.13 
    λ=.25   -0.12   -0.13   -0.15   -0.15 
    λ=.5   -0.15   -0.15   -0.13   -0.11 
 
B. The Sticky-Information Model 
 
   α=.05    α=.1   α=.5   α=1.0         
  λ=.1   0.49   0.39   0.05   -0.04 
    λ=.25   0.51   0.43   0.12     0.02 
    λ=.5   0.52   0.44      0.21    0.13 
 
Note: This table shows the correlation between output yt and the 
change in inflation πt+2 - πt-2.  These correlations assume money 
growth follows the process: Δmt = 0.5Δmt-1 + εt.  
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Appendix: Details of solutions 
  This appendix explains the solutions of the three models 
presented in the text. 
 
I. The derivation of the sticky-price Phillips curve 
  From the equations for the adjustment price xt and the price 
level pt, breaking the sum and using the law of iterated 
expectations, we obtain: 
(A1)    xt = λ p*t + (1-λ) Etxt+1, 
(A2)    pt = λ xt + (1-λ) pt-1. 
But then solving for xt in (A2) and replacing in (A1) for xt and 
xt+1, together with the definition of p*t = pt + αyt, yields the 
desired expression for inflation presented in the text. 
 
II. The derivation of the sticky-information Phillips curve 
  Begin with the equation for the price level derived in the 
text: 
              ∞  
(A3)    pt = λ  Σ (1-λ)
j Et-j(pt + αyt). 
             j=0 
By taking out the first term and redefining the summation index, 
this equation can be written as: 
                          ∞  
(A4)    pt = λ(pt + αyt)+ λ Σ (1-λ)
j+1 Et-1-j(pt + αyt). 
                   j=0 
 
Analogous to equation (A3), the previous period's price level can 
be written as:  
 
 




                   ∞  
(A5)    pt-1 = λ Σ (1-λ)
j Et-1-j(pt-1 + αyt-1). 
              j=0 
Subtracting (A5) from (A4) and rearranging yields the following 
equation for the inflation rate: 
                     ∞  
(A6)     πt = λ(pt + αyt)+ λ Σ (1-λ)
j Et-1-j(πt + αgt)  
                   j=0 
 
                    ∞  
     -  λ
2 Σ (1-λ)
j Et-1-j(pt + αyt). 
                  j=0 
 
Now equation (A4) can be rearranged to show that: 
 
                        ∞  
(A7)    pt  - [αλ/(1-λ)]yt = λ Σ (1-λ)
j Et-1-j(pt + αyt). 
                     j=0 
We now use equation (A7) to substitute for the last term in 
equation (A6).  After rearranging, we obtain 
                     ∞  
(A8)     πt = [αλ/(1-λ)]yt  + λ Σ (1-λ)
j Et-1-j(πt + αgt). 
                    j=0 
 
This is the sticky-information Phillips curve presented in the 
text. 
 
III. The response of output and inflation in the three policy 
experiments 
  The three policy experiments we undertake can be described as 
follows:  
  (E1) An unexpected fall in the level of aggregate demand by 
10% at date 0.  Thus, mt=-log(0.9) for t<0 and mt=0 for t≥ 0.  
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  (E2) An unexpected drop in the rate of money growth _mt at 
date 0, from 2.5% per period to 0%.  Thus, mt=0.025(1+t) for 
t≤ -1, mt=0 for t≥ 0.  
  (E3) Same as (E2) but announced at date t=-8. 
We focus on finding solutions for pt as a function of mt.  The 
solution for yt then follows from the aggregate demand equation. 
  For the backward-looking model, the solution follows 
immediately once the aggregate demand equation is used to 
substitute out for y: 
(A9)    pt(1+β) = 2pt-1  - pt-2  + βmt. 
This is a second-order difference equation.  The associated roots 
are [1±(-β)
1/2]/(1+β), which are complex (since β>0), generating 
the oscillatory behavior. 
  For the sticky-price model, rewrite the Phillips curve, using 
the aggregate demand equation, as: 
(A10)    E tpt+1 - (2 + β)pt + pt-1 = -βmt. 
This is an expectational difference equation, which can be solved 
by the methods explained in Sargent (1986). First, take 
expectations at t and express all expectations at t variables with 
*. Then using the lag operator L, such that LEtpt=Etpt-1 and its 
inverse, the forward operator, F=L
-1 such that FEtpt=Etpt+1, 
reexpress (A5) as: 
(A11)   (F




2 - (2 + β)x + 1), has two positive roots: θ and 
1/θ, such that (1-θ)
2/θ = β. Pick θ to correspond to the smaller  
 
 
  33 
of the roots. Then (A11) becomes: 
(A12)   (1  - θL) pt
* = (1 - θ)
2 (1 - Fθ)
-1 mt
*. 
But using the fact that θ < 1, the inverse on the right-hand side 
is well defined and can be expanded. Finally, since pt and pt-1 are 
part of date t information set, we obtain the final solution: 
 
             ∞  
(A13)   p t = θ pt-1 + (1-θ)
2 Σ θ
i Etmt+i. 
           i=0 
 
  For the policy experiment E1, up to date 0, pt=mt=-log(0.9). 
From 0 onwards, Etmt+i=mt+i=0, so the price level is given by the 
recursion pt=θpt-1 with initial condition p-1=-log(0.9). For E2, 
pt=mt until t=-1, and after again pt=θpt-1, but now the initial 
condition is p-1=0. Thus pt=0, t≥ 0 and so yt=0 at all t. For E3, in 
the period -8≤ t≤ -1, then the terms of the sum in the right hand 
side of (A13) are Etmt+i=0.025(1+t) for -8≤ t+i≤ -1 and Etmt+i=0 for 
t+i≥ 0. After that, for t≥ 0, pt=θpt-1. 
  Finally, consider the sticky-information model, as captured 
by the equation: 
       ∞  
(A14)   p t = λ Σ (1-λ)
j Et-j[(1-α)pt + αmt)]. 
     j=0 
 
The price level at time t≥ 0 can then be broken into two 
components, where the first includes price setters aware of the 
new path for aggregate demand, and the second those agents who 
decided on their prices before the change:  
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         t              ∞  
(A15) pt = λ Σ(1-λ)
jEt-j[(1-α)pt+αmt)] + λ Σ(1-λ)
jEt-j[(1-α)pt+αmt)]. 
      j=0                j=t+1 
 
Because the agents represented by the second term are still 
setting prices based on their old information sets, their 
expectations are given by Et-jpt=Et-jmt =-log(0.9).  As a result, the 
second term reduces to -log(0.9)(1-λ)
t+1. The agents represented by 
the first term are responded to the new path of aggregate demand, 
so Et-jmt = 0, and since we are solving for the perfect-foresight 
equilibrium, Et-jpt = pt. Collecting terms and rearranging, we 
obtain the solution: 
(A16)   p t =  [-log(0.9)(1-λ)
t+1]/[1-(1-α)(1-(1-λ)
t+1)]. 
This equation gives the solution for the price level in sticky-
information model under policy experiment E1. 
  We can find the outcome under policy experiment E2 with 
similar steps.  Under E2, however, Et-jpt = Et-jmt = 0.025(1+t) for 
t-j<0.  Thus, the solution is: 
(A17)   p t = [0.025(1+t)(1-λ)
t+1]/[1-(1-α)(1-(1-λ)
t+1)]. 
This equation gives the price level in the sticky-information 
model under policy experiment E2. 
  Finally, for E3, for t<0, the path is the same as expected by 
all agents, so pt=mt=0.025(t+1) and yt=0. After date 0, pt is given 
by (note the limit of the sums): 
        t+8                ∞  
(A18) pt = λ Σ(1-λ)
jEt-j[(1-α)pt+αmt)] + λ Σ(1-λ)
jEt-j[(1-α)pt+αmt)]. 
      j=0              j=t+9  
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All else is the same as in E2.  The solution follows as: 
(A19)  pt = [0.025(1+t)(1-λ)
t+9]/[1-(1-α)(1-(1 - λ)
t+9)]. 
This equation gives the path of the price level for the sticky-
information model under policy experiment E3. 
 
IV. Output and inflation when money growth is AR(1) 
  Suppose Δmt = ρΔmt-1 + εt, where εt is white noise and  ρ < 1. 
It will prove convenient to write this in MA(∞ ) form: 
 
    ∞               ∞    ∞  
(A20)  Δmt = Σ ρ
j εt-j   or   mt = Σ   Σ ρ
j εt-j-k.  
  j=0              k=0  j=0 
 
  Consider first the backward-looking model. First-differencing 
both sides of (A9), multiplying through by (1-ρL) and rearranging 
yields the following AR(3) for the inflation rate: 
(A21)    πt = [1+β]
-1 {[2+ρ(1+β)]πt-1 - (2ρ+1)πt-2 + ρπt-3 + βεt}. 
From this equation, we can calculate impulse responses and all 
moments of inflation.  
  Consider now the sticky-price model. We find the general 
solution of these rational expectation models by the method of 
undetermined coefficients as outlined in Taylor (1985). Since the 
money growth rate is stationary, it is a reasonable conjecture 
that the inflation rate is also stationary and so can be expressed 
in the MA(∞ ) general form: 
         ∞        ∞    ∞  
(A22)    πt = Σ φj εt-j   or   pt = Σ   Σ φj εt-j-k 
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where the φj are coefficients to be determined. Then realize that 
Et{εt+i-j-k}=εt+i-j-k for i-j≤ k and is zero otherwise.  Using the 
solution of the model in (A12): 
   ∞   ∞         ∞   ∞             ∞    ∞    ∞  
(A23) Σ  Σ φj εt-j-k= θΣ  Σ φj εt-1-j-k +(1-θ)
2 Σ θ
i Σ   Σ  ρ
j εt+i-j-k. 
  k=0 j=0       k=0 j=0           i=0 j=0 k=Max{i-j,0} 
 
But then, since this must hold for all possible realizations of 
εt-j, matching coefficients on both sides of this equation yields 
for the coefficient on εt: 
      ∞     i 
(A24)    φ0 =  (1-θ)
2 Σ θ
i  Σ  ρ
j  =  (1-θ)/(1-θρ). 
      i=0    j=0 
 
And for a general v, the coefficient on εt-v: 
    v     v-1      ∞    i+v 
(A25)    Σ φj = θ Σ φj + (1-θ)
2 Σ θ
i  Σ ρ
j. 
    j=0     j=0     i=0  j=0 
 
This yields: 
   v-1 
(A26)  φv = (θ-1) Σ φj + [(1-θ)
2/(1-ρ)][1/(1-θ) - ρ
v+1/(1-θρ)]. 
   j=0 
 
Equations (A22), (A24) and (A26) fully describe the stochastic 
process of inflation. The impulse response of inflation for a unit 
shock to aggregate demand is given by {φv}. The autocorrelation 
coefficients of order j are then given by (see Hamilton, 1994, p. 
52): 
   ∞    ∞  
(A27)    Σ φv φv-j / Σ φv
2. 
   v=j   v=0 
 
  Consider now the sticky-information model. Similarly to  
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(A22), conjecture the solution: πt = Σ γi εt-i or pt = Σ Σ γi εt-i-k, 
where the sums go from 0 to infinity. Taking the relevant 
expectations and substituting in (A8), the equation for the 
Phillips curve, we obtain: 
   ∞              ∞     ∞      ∞     ∞  
(A28) Σ γi εt-i = [αλ/(1-λ)].[ Σ ρ
i Σ εt-k-i - Σ γi Σ εt-k-i ] + 
  i=0           i=0  k=0    i=0  k=0 
 
           ∞    ∞        ∞  
   + λ Σ (1-λ)
j [ (1-α) Σ γi εt-i + α Σ ρ
i εt-i ]. 
         j=0        i=j+1    i=j+1 
So, again matching coefficients: 
(A29)  γ0 = αλ/[1-λ(1-α)], 
         k          k-1    k    k 
(A30)  γv = [1-λ(1-α)Σ (1-λ)
i ]




    i=0            i=0      i=1  i=0 
 
This provides the full characterization of the stochastic process 
for inflation.  For this, impulse responses, autocorrelations, and 
cross-correlations can be easily calculated. 
 
V. Impulse responses of output and population correlations between 
output and the change in inflation. 
  For the backward-looking model, corr(πt+2-πt-2,yt)=corr[πt+2-πt-
2,(πt-πt-1)/β], which we can evaluate using (A21).  Corr(πt+4-πt-4,yt) 
follows likewise. 
  For the sticky-price model, note that output growth is given 
from the quantity theory: Δyt = Δmt -  πt = Σ (ρ
j-φj)  εt-j.  From 
this, we can obtain the MA(∞ ) for output: yt = Σ ωjεt-j with the 
recursion ωj = ωj-1 + ρ
j-φj, initiated by ω0 = 1 - φ0. The impulse  
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response to a unit shock is given by the sequence {ωv}.  To solve 
for the change in inflation πt+4-πt, start with πt = Σ φj εt-j; the 
coefficients in the MA(∞ ) representation for the change in 
inflation πt+4-πt = Σ ξjεt-j are then given by ξj = φj - φj-4 with ξ0 
=  φ0,  ξ1 = φ1,  ξ2 =   φ2, and ξ3 = φ3.  Given these results, the 
population cross-correlation between the change in inflation and 
output, corr(πt+2-πt-2,yt), is: 
 
   ∞    ∞  
(A31)    Σ φv ξv / (Σ φv
2)(Σ ξv+2
2). 
   v=0   v=0 
 
The cross-correlation corr(πt+4-πt-4,yt) is derived in the same 
fashion. 
  The derivation of the population cross-correlations in the 
sticky-information model is precisely the same, except we start 
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Sticky Information Backward Looking Sticky PricesFigure 2.
Dynamic paths given an unanticipated fall in the growth rate
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Sticky Information Backward Looking Sticky PricesFigure 3.
Dynamic paths given an announcement at date -8 of a fall in the growth rate
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Dynamic paths after a negative one standard deviation (-0.007) shock
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